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I. INTRODUCTION 
The criminal justice system in this country is well established. It is formally enshrined in 
The United States Constitution through the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor has a long history of working in the criminal justice 
system both as an Assistant District Attorney (ADA) in New York, as a judge for the Southern 
District of New York (S.D.N.Y.) and as a judge for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 
This paper will start with a biography of Justice Sotomayor, and then will discuss her 
judicial style on the bench, and how that is related to who she is as a person, her previous 
professional experiences, and what she personally believes in. From there, this paper will 
discuss her judicial style through a case regarding standing, Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority1 , 
and then by focusing on her judicial style through a criminal law and procedure lens. 
Throughout this paper, both Justice Sotomayor's judicial style, and my theory that she 
"~ 
sometimes appeai~se her experience working in criminal law to help her decide some of the 
cases. This paper will then conclude by highlighting that as a Supreme Court Justice, in her 
short tenure on the Court thus far, she h~o thoroughly demonstrate her judicial style in the 
short time she has been on the bench. Additionally, this paper will restate the theory that when 
she departs from her established judicial style, it appears that she supplements her theory with 
her personal knowledge and experience of the criminal justice system. 
II. BIOGRAPHY 
Justice Sotomayor was born on June 25, 1948 in a small area of the Bronx, which at that 
time was like a little part of Puerto Rico in New York2 . She grew up in two juxtaposed 
communities-the vibrant, colorful, family-oriented comer of the South Bronx, where her family 
1 Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012). 
2 Sonia Sotomayor, My Beloved World. 
and family friends all lived within blocks of one another, in various tenements, and then later the 
Bronxdale Projects; and her schooling at the Blessed Sacrament Catholic school run by Father 
Dolan and Sisters of Charity, implementing discipline and rigor in every action taken at school. 
While still in elementary school, there were two principle events that made a lasting impression 
on her life. When she was eight, she was diagnosed as a diabetic, which required her to learn 
how to self-administer shots of insulin so that it wouldn't be another point of argument between 
her parents. The second, just a year later, was when her father passed. 
After elementary school, she attended high school at Cardinal Spellman High School 
where she excelled academically during the year, and took odd jobs during the summer. After 
high school, she earned her bachelors in history from Princeton University graduating summa 
cum laude. The summer before she started at Yale Law School, she married her high school 
sweetheart Kevin Noonan. While at Yale, she was the editor of the Yale Law Journal and 
graduated in 1979. 
After graduating from law school, Justice Sotomayor worked as an NY County Assistant 
DA in the trial division, and she stayed with the NY County DA's office for five years, litigating 
her highest profile case in 1983. During this time, she was also heavily involved in various 
public service organizations. In 1980, she was nominated to the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and 
Education Fund board of Directors (PRLDEF), only a year out of law school, and seven months 
into her career. 
In 1984, again two more events happened that changed her life. She got a divorce from 
her husband, at that time a student Princeton and she left the DA's office to enter private 
practice, where she was an associate of Pavia & Harcourt. While there, she worked primarily in 
IP law, going after merchants who sold counterfeit replicas of the products of her customers. A 
2 
year after starting at Pavia, Justice Sotomayor participated in another public service organization, 
by serving on the board of the Maternity Center Association in Manhattan for two years in 1985 
& 86. While at Pavia, one of her biggest clients was Fendi, and one day while in Chinatown, she 
chased a countetfeit Fendi dealer, following them to their warehouse where there were hundreds, 
if not thousands of counterfeit Fendi bags throughout the warehouse. Four years after working at 
Pavia & Harcourt, she was elected to membership as a partner. Even though she was elected to a 
membership as a partner, when two of the partners-George Pavia and Dave Botwinik informed 
her of the vote of the current partners, they told her that they knew she would be on the bench 
one day, possibly even the US Supreme Court. 
In 1991, their prediction came true when Justice Sotomayor was nominated to the 
Southern District of New York by President George H .W. Bush. In August of 1992, she was 
confirmed to the bench by a unanimous vote, making her the youngest judge in the Southern 
District. When confirmed, she was not only the youngest judge on the federal bench, but she 
was one of seven women, and the first Puerto Rican woman to serve as a judge in federal court. 
A mere five years into her judgeship, Justice Sotomayor was nominated to the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals by President Bill Clinton. Although her nomination and confirmation 
process was not as smooth as the first, she was confirmed to the Court of Appeals in October of 
1998. Although it was originally voiced by some democrats in 2005 for Justice Sotomayor to be 
nominated to the Supreme Court due to the vacancy created by Justice O'Connor, it wasn't until 
May of 2009 that she was nominated to the Supreme Court to fill the vacancy that was created 
when Justice Souter retired. She was confirmed by the Senate and appointed to the bench in July 
of 2009, becoming the first Hispanic Woman to serve on the United States Supreme Court. 
III. JUDICIAL STYLE 
3 
Through her years as a judge, she developed a judicial style, which she coined as "fidelity 
in the law." Fidelity in the law is a three-pronged analysis that she has used in the majority of 
her opinions, concurrences, and dissents that she has authored while on the Court. However, this 
paper also asserts the theory that in some cases, she supplements her judicial style with her 
personal knowledge and experience about the criminal justice system. 
The three prongs that make up her judicial style are: to interpret the constitution 
according to its terms; interpret statutes according to their terms; and hewing faithfully to 
precedents established by the Court3 . It is because of this three-pronged evaluation, and the 
theory that she utilizes personal knowledge regarding the criminal justice system to supplement 
her theory, that her judicial style is unique. Instead of adhering to one of the standard types of 
judicial styles of textualism, originalism, or judicial activism, she seems to have created her own 
style that deviates from the three well-established traditional styles. 
IV . .JUDICIAL STYLE SEEN THROUGH A STANDING CASE 
A standing case is one of the most central and seemingly basic types of cases that is 
evaluated by a court. This is demonstrated through the fact that at the forefront of all cases is the 
pivotal issue of whether the parties have the ability to make their argument in the court they are 
in. To this, there is a requirement that there be a an injury to the party bringing suit, and that the 
court must have the proper jurisdiction to hear the case that is being brought before them. 
Regardless of the issues raised in a given case, if the parties do not have standing, then their case 
will not be able to be adjudicated by the judge of the court they are in. Due to the pivotal role 
that a standing case has to the American jurisprudence system, this paper begins with evaluating 
a standing case because in it, she clearly demonstrates her judicial style. 
3 Opening Statement by Judge Sonia Sotomayor Before the Senate Judiciary Committee: Hearing on Confirmation 
of Supreme Court Nominee Sonia Sotomayor Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 11th Congress (2009) 
(Transcript of Opening Statement by Judge Sonia Sotomayor) . 
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In 2012, Justice Sotomayor issued the decision of the court in Mohamad v. Palestinian 
Authority. In this case, the court held that under the statute under which Mohamad was seeking 
relief, the Palestinian Authority, as an organization rather than an individual was not able to be 
sued. Mohamad was a relative of the now deceased Azzam Rahim. Rahim, a naturalized 
American citizen, while on a trip to the West Bank in 1995, was imprisoned, tortured and killed 
while in the custody of the Palestinian Authority4 . Mohamad sued under the Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2013i. Under the TVPA, a petitioner can 
bring a cause for action against an individual for acts of torture, or the killing that is a result of 
such torture under explicit or implied authority of any foreign entity6• In this case, the court held 
that Mohamad did not have standing to sue the Palestinian Authority because the organization 
does not count as an individual for purposes of the statute 7 . 
In making this decision, Justice Sotomayor uses her three-prong approach of fidelity in 
the law to determine whethe;).f Mohamad had the authority to assert jurisdiction over the 
·" 
Palestinian Authority, giving Mohamad the necessary standing to sue under the TVPA 8 . In this 
case, there was a federal statute which was the determining factor in deciding if the petitioners 
had standing to sue the Palestinian Authority. Understanding this, Justice Sotomayor evaluated 
the relevant statute involved. In doing this, while she did not utilize all aspects of her three-
pronged approach, her approach to the case still demonstrates her judicial style. In interpreting 
the statute at issue in this case, Justice Sotomayor first evaluated the statute, looking for 
ambiguous terms in the statute. The statute at issue did not directly define "individual," which 
helped in Justice Sotomayor coming to the conclusion that in this statute, "individual" was an 
4 Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1705(2012). 
5 Torture Victim Protection Act §1350, 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2013). 
6 Mohamad at 1705 [emphasis added]. 
7 ld. at 1705. 
8 /d. at 1706. 
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ambiguous term which would be the determining factor of if the petitioners had the requisite 
standing to proceed with their case. Since the statute did not directly define the term, Justice 
Sotomayor first relied on the dictionary meaning of the word individual, and interpreted the 
statute to mean that "individual" was only in reference to a individual person , as is commonly 
understood in the vernacular of the word . By taking this approach, Sotomayor demonstrated her 
judicial theory through the third prong-hewing faithfully to precedents established by the Court 
by adhering to the precedent previously established by the court in regards to ambiguous terms. 
The first case she cites to in evaluating the case law is FCC v. AT &tJ, , which held that 
when a statute does not explicitly define a term, then its ordinary meaning should be the point of 
reference for the term10 • Justice Sotomayor used the dictionary definition of the word individual 
to mean "a person." The second case Justice Sotomayor relied on in regards to following the 
clearly established precedent of the court was Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA. v. 
Brown11 , which demonstrate that when a term that has a common usage is used in a way that can 
be ambiguous, that it is standard to use the common usage meaning of the term12 • To this, 
Justice Sotomayor noted that the everyday, or common usage of the term individual is to 
highlight a difference between a person and a corporation or organization13 • It is because of this, 
that the court held that because the statute at issue only gave the court the authority to assert 
jurisdiction over an "individual" -which the Court held is only applicable to a naturalized 
person, that the petitioners in this case did not have the standing to assert their claim in Court. 
In deciding this case , by relying not only on the statute under which the claim was 
originally made, but by also evaluating the relevant case law that was previously established by 
9 FCC v. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) 
10 Mohamad at 1706. 
11 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations , SA . v . Brown, 131 S . Ct. 2846 (20 11) . 
12 Mohamad at 1707. 
13 /d. 
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the court, Justice Sotomayor utilized two of the three prongs of her judicial style. Mohamad 
aptly demonstrates Justice Sotomayor's evaluative technique that is at the heart of her judicial 
style. While she did not fully utilize all three aspects of her judicial style, that is because it was 
not necessary because there was no Constitutional issue that needed to be interpreted in this case. 
By clearly evaluating the relevant statute and the case law together, Justice Sotomayor clearly 
and efficiently reached the conclusion that perfectly aligned with the history of the court, while 
utilizing her distinct judicial style. 
While a standing case is just one type of a case that a Justice is called on to address, in 
Mohamad, Justice Sotomayor clearly adhered to her three-pronged judicial practice. This 
adherence to her judicial practice is exemplified in many cases, but below is a discussion of 
criminal cases in which she wrote an opinion, a concurrence, or a dissent to demonstrate her 
... ~ 
judicial style. As previously stated, in the proceeding evaluations, this paper will also assert he 
hypothesis that Justice Sotomayor sometimes brings in her personal knowledge and experience 
in evaluating cases, which while not explicitly stated, is apparent in some of the cases that she 
writes Mr. 
V. JUDICIAL STYLE DEMONSTRATED IN CRIMINAL CASES 
A. Fidelity in the Law in Criminal Law Opinions 
As a Supreme Court Justice, Sotomayor has written many opinions in the field of 
criminal procedure. Through all of these opinions, it is clear that she does her best to stick to her 
overall goal of approaching each case while concentrating on her three-prong analysis described 
by her judicial style. However, while it is her primary goal to be neutral and not let her personal 
opinions or experience taint her judgment, it appears that she sometimes relies on and utilizes her 
personal knowledge and experience in evaluating her three prong analysis. There are a series of 
7 
opinions that are authored by Justice Sotomayor that demonstrate her ability and style of sticking 
to her three pronged judicial style as she described it when she spoke during her confirmation 
hearings. The cases discussed in this case are: Wood v. Allen14 ; J.B .D. v. North Carolina15 ; 
Evans v. Michigan16; Missouri v. McNeely17; and Moncrieffe v. Holder18 . In each of these cases, 
Justice Sotomayor utilized her there-prong analysis, but in some cases she also demonstrates the 
theory espoused in the paper-that she sometimes supplements her three-prong theory with her 
personal knowledge and experience. 
1. Sotomayor Upheld her Fidelity in the Law Judicial Theory Demonstrated In Wood v. 
After being confirmed to the Court, the first criminal procedure decision that Sotomayor 
wrote f~ was Wood v. Allen, in which for the first time as a Supreme Court Justice, she 
employed her two-thirds of her three-prong "fidelity in the law" approach. In Wood, the Court 
evaluated a habeas corpus petition for a prisoner who was seeking post conviction relief under an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim stating that his counsel failed to raise evidence of his 
mental instabilities. In raising this claim, Wood asserted both a 28 U.S. C. §§2254(d)(2) and 
2254(e)(l) claims under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) Act. In 
making the evaluation regarding this claim, Sotomayor only utilized two-thirds of her three-
prong system. In Wood, there was no constitutional issue, so in evaluating the two-prong 
analysis the Court looked to the statutes that were at issue and the previous case law that directly 
related to previously heard AEDPA cases. Under AEPDA, §2254, for a case to be evaluated 
fully by the Court, first all state remedies available to the petitioner must be exhausted. 
14 Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290 (2010) 
15 J.BD. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) 
16 Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069 (2013) 
17 Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) 
18 Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 168 (2013) 
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However, even if all the state based claims are not exhausted, if there was an unreasonable 
determination made by the state court proceeding , then the petitioner has the ability have their 
habeas corpus petition granted certiorari by the Court. In Wood, the Court evaluated whether or 
not Wood fully executed all of his available state-based claims, and made a determination 
regarding whether there was an unreasonable determination made by the state court. In the 
application for certiorari, Wood raised two different issues to the court-AEDPA §2254( d)(2) 
and 2254(e)(l). Wood is a case that applied for certiorari to the Supreme Court from the 
Eleventh Circuit, and so to this, the court looked to the decision of the Appeals Court to 
determine if, based on the text of the statute being relied on, the case was properly decided. In 
addressing the two issues raised, the Court found that the Eleventh Circuit properly addressed the 
issue, and there was no unreasonable determination by the reviewing state court. The Court held 
that in addition to the fact that the proceeding court did not make any unreasonable 
determinations, that the additional claim asserted by Wood-ineffective assistance of counsel 
was a meritless one. Under the three-prong approach to case evaluation , after evaluating the 
statute , Sotomayor evaluated the relevant precedent of the Court before issuing the Court's 
decision on the case. It was through evaluating both AEDPA and the precedent, that Sotomayor 
issued a decision in the case that fell under the auspices of her judicial theory of "fidelity in the 
law." 
AEDPA is the Federal Act under which prisoners may bring federal habeas corpus claims 
so that they have the opportunity to have some post-conviction relief. Wood issued a claim 
under §§2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(l)19 . The text of §2254(d)(2) states: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any 
19 Federal Habeas Corpus, State Custody Remedies in Federal Courts §2254, 28 U .S .C . §§2254(d)(2) and 
2254( e )(1 )(20 13) , 
9 
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the 
adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.20 
Under this statute , when a claim is made, the reviewing court analyzes the original state decision , 
and then makes a determination about whether or not the original state decision was made 
correctly. In this case, the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted Wood's 
petition, and held that the court-appointed attorneys in Wood's original case were ineffective by 
not fully evaluating his potential mental disability . This decision was appealed to the Eleventh 
Circuit, which overturned the decision of the District Court. After this decision, the petitioner 
then applied for certiorari to be granted by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to evaluate the relationship between §2254(d)(2) and §2254(e)(l). In addition to 
holding that the decision of the state Court was not an unreasonable determination, the Court 
held that the attorney appointed to Wood was nq~}~~5t~-,~~n~e of counsel. It is because 
of these two determinations, that the Court decided that the evaluation of Wood's case would end 
with a §2254(d)(2) determination, and to not make an evaluation based on §2254(e)(l). 
In addressing the relationship between the two sub-sections of §2254 that were raised in 
Wood's petition for relief, Justice Sotomayor looked at both the meaning of the statute, and 
previous precedent of the Court for guidance. To make the determination about whether or not 
the decision made by the state court-to not allow evidence or pursue a line of questioning that 
would have led a jury to conclude the Wood suffered from mental deficiencies was a reasonable 
determination based on the facts presented-Justice Sotomayor looked to Williams v. Taylor21 . 
This case held that while unreasonable is difficult to define, a decision made by a state court is 
not unreasonable just because the reviewing federal court would have reached a different 
20 Wood v. Allen , 558 U.S. at 293 (2013) . 
2 1 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) . 
10 
conclusion. Sotomayor went on to cite to Rice v. Collins22 , in which the Court reversed the 
Ninth Circuit's decision that the state court decision was unreasonable. In this, she demonstrated 
deference to both the statute at issue and the precedent established by the court, which is the goal 
of her three-pronged analysis. In Wood, the Court held that the state court determination that the 
attorneys made a strategic decision to not assert a mental instability defense or bring up instances 
of Wood's mental deficiencies, and that because that decision was not unreasonable under the 
language of the statute, and the precedent established by the Court, they affirmed the decision of 
the Eleventh Circuit. In regard to the other claim under §2254, that was raised by Wood in his 
petition, the Court held that there was no need to address that claim because there is no claim to 
be asserted, even under the way that Wood read§ 2254(d)(2), that a discussion of§ 2254(e)(1) is 
barred by the statute . 
The reason the Court held that a discussion of §2254(e)(1) was barred by statute is 
because all of the requirements under §2254(d)(2) were not fulfilled. Under the statute, 
§2254(e)(l) can only be addressed by the Court when the requirements of §2254(d)(2) are 
fulfilled completely. Without the previous statutory requirements being completely fulfilled, the 
Court cannot address the issues raised under §2254(e)(1). 
2. Sotomayor Upheld her Fidelity in the Law Judicial Theory Which is Demonstrated 
Through J.B.D. v. North Carolina 
In 2011, Justice Sotomayor wrote the decision for a court with a narrow majority, 
answering the question of whether a person's age has an impact on whether they are in custody 
for Miranda purposes. In JDB., the Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue presented.sjf 
whether a child's age is an aspect to be considered when the court is making a decision on 
22 Rice v. Collins , 546 U.S.333 (2006), 
11 
whether or not a person was in custody for purposes of a Miranda evaluation?3 In J.D.B. , a 
seventh grader was escorted out of class by a uniformed officer, then taken to a conference room 
where the officers questioned him about a few robberies that had taken place in a nearby 
neighborhood.Z4 Once in this room, J.D.B. and the officer were joined by two administrators 
from his school, and an additional police officer ?5 The officers asked him questions regarding 
the reason why he was in the neighborhood where the break-ins occurred , and after not directly 
informing the officers or school administrators why he was there, one of the officers stated that 
he may go to juvenile detention for the stealing of the goods?6 It was ordy after learning about 
the prospect of being sent to juvenile detention that J .D .B. confessed that he and an acquaintance 
were responsible for the break-ins in the neighborhood?7 After confessing, the officers informed 
J .B.D. that he was free to leave , and that if he wanted to, he could refuse to answer any of the 
questions that he is or was asked.28 After the meeting was over , J.D.B. took the bus home that 
day?9 Throughout the questioning, his grandmother, his legal guardian, was never called, and he 
was not permitted to speak to her30 . At trial, the court declined J .D .B.'s motion to suppress the 
statements that were given to the officers because they disagreed with the assertion that J.D.B. 
was subject to a custodial interrogation.31 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision of the district court that held that the age of an individual being questioned is not 
determinative in addressing whether or not a person is being held custodially32 • The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether or not a person's age should be 
23 JBD. at 2398 . 
24 /d . at 2399. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 2400. 
28 ld. 
29 /d. 
30 /d. 
3 1 /d. at 2400. 
32 ld. 
12 
included in a Miranda analysis to determine if a person was subjected to a custodial 
interrogation33 . The Court overturned the decisions of the previous courts, holding that age is a 
factor in a Miranda decision34 . To make the decision regarding whether or not J .D .B. was in 
custody, or if a youth's age in general should be a factor in a Miranda evaluation, Sotomayor 
broadly utilized her three prong analysis, while specifically focusing on the precedent previously 
established by the Court. 
In reviewing the case de novo, Sotomayor relied on previously established case law, 
utilizing five previous cases, in which the court has made decisions regarding the Miranda 
evaluations. Sotomayor utilized the analyses in these various cases like puzzle pieces to put 
together the puzzle that created the decision of the Court. The six cases that Sotomayor used 
were Thompson v. Keohane35 , Dickerson v. United States36 , Stansbury v. California37 , Eddings v. 
Oklahoma38 , and Betollit v. Bush39• 
When evaluating the case law, and the case in front of the Court, because it was being 
reviewed de novo, the Court evaluated the case before them as a two-prong analysis to answer 
the central question of the case of was J .D .B. subjected to a custodial interrogation. The first 
prong the court addressed was whether or not J.D.B. was held cusotidally when he was 
questioned, and if he was asked questions in a style that was similar to a custodial interrogation. 
To answer these questions, citing to Thompson, the Court stated that in determining the 
answer to their question of whether J .D.B. was subjected to a custodial interrogation were by 
looking at the circumstances that surrounded in interrogation and to make a determination if a 
33 /d. at 2401. 
34 /d. 
35 Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 ( 1995). 
36 Dickerson v .· United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
37 Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994). 
38 Eddings v . Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1988). 
39 Betollit v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979 
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reasonable person, in the same circumstances would heave believed that they were free to 
leave.40 Additionally, the Court cited to Dickerson, stating that when a person is subjected to a 
custodial interrogation, there is a "heightened risk" to the statements made during the 
confessions because of the pressures surrounding a custodial interrogation.41 
In this case, the issue was not just if a person was subjected to a custodial interrogation, 
but if the determination of that, should their age be a factor. To answer this question, the Court 
cited to Stansbury, stating that a child's age has an impact on how a reasonable person would 
have perceived their ability to leave.42 Additionally, the Court cited to Eddings, stating that 
children are more susceptible to influence than adults43 , and that this difference makes it such 
that evaluating a child's age is necessary to determine if they believed they were free to leave. 
Last, citing to Betollit, the Court reiterated the holding that a child often doesn't have the 
requisite experience and perspective to recognize and when possible, avoid decisions which may 
be detrimental to them later. 
Utilizing the aforementioned cases, Sotomayor asserted the holding that yes, a child's age 
should be a factor when making a determination regarding whether or not a person is being held 
and subjected to a custodial interrogation. In 1 D.B., he was held in a room at the school, but 
was not able to talk to his legal guardian, and the officers did not inform J .D .B. that he was free 
to go at any time or that he did not have to answer their questions until the interrogation was 
over. to the conclusion that in this case based on the facts and established case law that because 
i"\.f~ 
of his age and mentality, J .D.B. was held for purposes of a custodial interrogation. More 
poignantly, the Court issued a new rule which expressed the idea that a person's age should 
40 J.DB .. at 2402. 
41 !d. at 2401 (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. at 112 (1995)). 
42 !d. at 2403 (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. at 435 (2000)). 
43 /d. at 2405 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 115 (1988)). 
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inform a reviewing court's Miranda analysis. Specifically, Sotomayor stated" ... . so long as the 
child's age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been 
objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent 
with the objective nature of that test.44" 
In the evaluation of this case, Sotomayor used her three prong analysis by evaluating the 
impact of the Constitution on her decision, because it was a Fifth Amendment case, and by 
looking at the relevant case law that spoke to the question that was presented to the Court. 
Under the Fifth Amendment, a person cannot be forced to incriminate themselves . However, 
based on the actions of the officers and school administrators in this case, that is what J .D.B. was 
forced to do when he was held custodially. In this case, Sotomayor also utilized her approach 
through evaluating the established case law, which when evaluated all together demonstrated that 
there was a recognizable difference between the mental acuity of an adult and a child. 
Furthermore, by evaluating the case law, Sotomayor demonstrated that this difference is such 
that when there is a reasonable person standard, or test that is utilized in a given case, the age of 
the person must be taken into consideration. It is alluded to that the reason why this is ·so is 
because a child is more impressionable and is more likely to believe that they are being held in 
such a way that they don't have the freedom to leave in a situation where an adult would not feel 
the same thing. In reaching this conclusion, Sotomayor demonstrated her fidelity in the law 
approach to evaluating the facts to the law as they were presented to her. 
3. Sotomayor Upheld her Fidelity in the Law Judicial Theory Which is Demonstrated 
Through Evans v. Michigan 
In 2013, Justice Sotomayor authored the opinions for three successive criminal procedure 
44 J .D.B. at 2408 (2013) 
15 
cases. The first of these cases is Evans v. Michigan45 , in which the Court granted certiorari to 
resolve the question regarding whether an improper mid-trial acquittal is still an acquittal for the 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy. 
In Evans, the defendant, Lamar Evans was acquitted of the arson charge that was brought 
against him when his attorney moved for a directed verdict by stating that the court did not prove 
all elements of the crime-namely that the fourth element of the offense with which Evans was 
charged, that the structure that was burned be a dwelling, was not proved by the state46 . The trial 
court granted the motion, and Evans was acquitted of the charges before the defense presented 
their case-in-chief7 . The state of Michigan appealed this decision, and the Michigan Court of 
Appeals reversed and remanded the decision back to the appeals court citing that the crime 
Evans committed was a lesser-included offense, and that proving the greater charge was not 
required48 . The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on 
appeal, holding that because the mid-trial acquittal was based on an error-of-law, that it was not 
an acquittal for the purpose of double-jeopardy protection as guaranteed under the Fifth 
Amendment49 • 
In Evans, the Court issued a holding stating that when there is an acquittal, even if it was 
because there was an error in the application of the law by the court, it is still an acquittal and the 
defendant is barred from being retried. In deciding whether or not an error in the application of 
the law bars a state from retrying a defendant after they have been acquitted due to the error, 
Sotomayor employed her standardized three-prong analysis. As with her decision in J .BD., 
when deciding this case, because it is a case whose controversy rises from one of the 
45 Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069 (2013) . 
46 Evans at 1073. 
47 /d. 
48 /d. at 1073. 
49 /d. 
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Amendments of the Constitution, she looked to the established Supreme Court precedent that 
Ball v. United States50 ; Pong Poo v. United States51 ; United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978)52 ; 
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.53 ; and Green v. United States54 . 
In Ball, the Court held that even an insufficient acquittal is an acquittal for the purposes 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In Pong Foo, the court held that even when there is an error in 
the decision made by the district judge which led to an acquittal, that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause bars retrial of the same defendant on the same facts. In relying on these cases, the court 
held that even when there is a mistake of law by the trial court in a case, when a defendant is 
acquitted of the crimes they were charged, the Fifth Amendment bars them being retried on the 
same issue. Additionally, in citing to Scott, which held the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar 
the same charges to be brought against the same defendant when there has been a dismissal of 
the original charges. Another case the Court cited to in Evans was Martin Linen, in which the 
Court held that an acquittal is achieved when there is a ruling by the court that the proof offered 
by the prosecution to prove their case is found to be insufficient. Using all of these cases, the 
Court reached the conclusion that while there was an error of law, because Evans was acquitted 
by the district court, a retrial was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
The last major case cited to in Evans was Green, in which the Court held that when a 
defendant is charged and then convicted of a lesser charge, they cannot be retried on the higher 
charge that they were acquitted of during the first case because that proceeding is barred by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. Citing to Green, Sotomayor stated it is imperative that the double 
50 Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1986). 
51 Fang Foo v. United States, 369 U.S . 141 (1962) 
52 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 ( 1978) 
53 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co ., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) 
54 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) 
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jeopardy clause be respected, which not only bars a retrial of an issue, but also bars the state that 
was originally prosecuting the case from appealing the ruling that created the original acquittae5. 
In Green, the Court held that because the government invariably has more resources than the 
majority of defendants that it tries, that to retry a defendant after they had been acquitted, there is 
a greater chance that a factually innocent defendant may be found guilty. 
4. Sotomayor Upheld her Fidelity in the Law Judicial Theory Which is Demonstrated 
Through Missouri v. McNeely 
In Missouri v . McNeely, the Court addressed the per se exigency that is required for the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to be waived, specifically in relation to the testing for 
blood alcohol levels 56 . In McNeely , the Court addressed the issue of whether the natural 
dissipation of alcohol in a person ' s blood creat€ such an exigency under the Fourth Amendment 
that it permits an intrusive warrantless search. In addressing this issue, the Court held that no, 
the natural dissipation of alcohol does not rise to an exception under the exigency standard that 
would not require a warrant to be secured before extracting a person's blood. In granting 
certiorari on this case, the Court sought to resolve~ a split in the circuits regarding the dissipation 
of alcohol in a person's blood and if that creates an exigency under the Fourth Amendment. 
In McNeely, unlike in the Fifth Amendment cases, Sotomayor employed all three aspects 
of her three prong judicial approach. In this case, Sotomayor looked at the United States 
Constitution, the local statute in Missouri, under which McNeely was originally charged, and the 
relevant precedent from both the Missouri and United States Supreme Court. In McNeely, the 
Court looked to almost a dozen cases, of which five can be used to demonstrate the way that 
Sotomayor utilized her three-prong approach to deciding a case. The five cases that can be used 
55 /d. at 1075 . 
56 McNeely at 1556 (2013) 
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to demonstrate Sotomayor's approach were: United States v. Robinson57 ; Schmerber v. 
California58 ; Brigham City v. Stuart59 ; and Tennessee v. Garner.60 However, before approaching 
the caselaw, Sotomayor first discussed the Fourth Amendment and relevant Missouri case law. 
Citing to Robinson, the Sotomayor stated that for a warrantless search to be reasonable, the 
search must fall within one of the established exceptions. 
This was a case whose original jurisdiction was Missouri, and it is because of this, that 
Sotomayor evaluated the statute under which McNeely was charged in addition to the larger 
Constitutional issues and relevant case law that was presented. After addressing the state statute, 
the Court looked to the text of the Fourth Amendment to start its evaluation of what is protected 
by the Fourth Amendment. After granting certiorari, the court held that the natural dissipation of 
alcohol in a person's blood does not create an exigency that would allow for a warrantless search 
of a person. 
In evaluating the case law, the Court cited to Robinson, which highlighted the fact that 
without an established exception to the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search is illegal. The 
court also looked to and differentiated McNeely from Schmerber, which directly addressed the 
issue of alcohol levels in a suspect's blood dissipating over time. In differencing the two cases, 
the Court highlighted that in Schmerber, based on the totality of the circumstances61 that 
surrounded the warrantless blood test, a warrantless blood draw was allowable, but that the 
circumstances in McNeely did not present such a case62 • In McNeely, the Court concluded that 
Schmerber required investigation of an accident, for which Schmerber's level of intoxication at 
57 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
58 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
59 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). 
60 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
61 See Brigham City at 406, stating that in making a determination to whether an exigency exits, the Court makes the 
decision based on a totality of the circumstances. 
62 McNeely at 1557 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757(1966)). 
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the time of the accident created an exigency that was not present in McNeely63 • While still citing 
to Schmerber, the Court in McNeely stated in Schmerber the technology at the time helped to 
create the exigency because when Schmerber was decided, the delay in getting a warrant was so 
great that all the alcohol from a person's blood could dissipate in that time.64 Additionally, the 
Court reasoned, in today's world, officers can and often get e-warrants which are acquired much 
quicker than the traditional paper warrants that were prevalent when Schmerber was decided.65 
Citing to Garner, the Court stated that compelled blood draws, unlike other type of 
searches have a greater privacy interest.66 Additionally, the Court stated that its ruling in 
McNeely would not hamper the police from being able to perform their duties and stop and arrest 
people for driving under the influence.67 
Here, Sotomayor utilized her three-prong analysis by evaluating the implications of the 
Fourth Amendment, the Missouri statute under which McNeely was convicted and the case law 
to support her holding. This case is a good example of her three-pronged analysis because it 
thoroughly demonstrates her judicial style in a straightforward manner. 
5. Sotomayor Upheld her Fidelity in the Law Judicial Theory Which is Demonstrated 
Through Moncrieffe v. Holder 
One of the last criminal law opinions that Sotomayor authored during the 2012 session 
that was in regards to criminal law and procedure was Moncrieffe v. Holder. In Moncrieffe, the 
Court addressed drug convictions and their relation to automatic deportability68 . In Moncrieffe, 
the Court addressed the issue of whether a person can be automatically deported when the crime 
they were convicted of meets the description of either a misdemeanor or a felony under the 
63/d. 
64 McNeely at 1561 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-771 (1966)). 
65 Id. 
66 McNeely at 1567 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 19 (1985)). 
67 McNeely at 1573. 
68 Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. 168 (2013). 
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Controlled Substances Act (CSA).69 The court addressed the issue of when evaluating the 
categorical approach to drug trafficking as outlined by the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA).70 The issue addressed is whether a person convicted for possessing a minor amount of 
marijuana is guilty of an aggravated felony under the INA when the state statute under which a 
person is convicted does not differentiate in quantity, therefore encompassing the provisions of 
both the misdemeanor and felony provisions of the INA 71 . Answering the issue raised in the 
negative, the court held that when the state statute does not differentiate in the same manner as 
the INA, a person is not automatically charged with an aggravated felony, which would require 
them to be deported automatically .72 
Moncrieffe is a Georgia resident Jamaican citizen who was found with a minimal amount 
of marijuana during a 2007 traffic stop73 . He was convicted under the Georgia Annotated Code, 
under which the sentencing judge gave him a lenient sentence as a first-time offender, requiring 
him to complete a five-year probation, after which, his record would be expunged74 . Under the 
Georgia statute, there was a possibility that Moncrieffe could have served over a year in prison?5 
As a Jamaican citizen, Moncreieffe was subjected to both the state law where he was convicted, 
and, if any federal or immigration laws that could have an impact on his immigration and 
residency status. The Georgia statute that Moncrieffe was convicted under included both 
trafficking and possession. Pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), when a person is 
convicted of drug trafficking crime, that is punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, it 
69 /d. at 1682. 
70 /d. 
71 /d. 
72 /d. 
73 Moncrieffe at 1683. 
74 /d. 
75 /d. 
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is categorized as an aggravated felony76 . Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a 
person who is convicted of an aggravated felony is automatically deportable 77 . The Court 
granted certiorari to decide if a person is convicted under a state criminal statute for possessing a 
minimal amount of marijuana, can be charged with having an aggravated felony on their record 
for the purpose of the INA 78 . 
In Moncrieffe, using her three-prong judicial approach, Sotomayor looked to the statutes, 
which make up the relevant aspects pursuant to the INA and the relevant case law. In 8 U.S.CA. 
§§ 1158, and 122979 , the INA discusses after committing one of the offenses that would cause a 
person to be deported and the primary removal exceptions under the law .80 These exceptions 
include asking for permission from the Attorney General for a stay of removal for due to the fact 
that the defendant has been present in the United States lawfully for years81 . Pursuant to 8 
U .S.CA. § 1101 82 , the INA defines all of the terms used in the act , what crimes are included in as 
an aggravated felony83 . In 8 U .S.CA. § 122784 , the INA states that if a person is convicted of an 
aggravated felony, then they are automatically deportable, and not allowed a pardon from 
deportability by the Attorney General85 • 
There are four cases cited to in Moncrieffe, each of which highlights an aspect of either a 
case decided under the INA or CSA, and how local statutes have been applied to cases that are 
deportable under the statutes. Under Sotomayor's judicial theory, the four cases highlighted are: 
76 /d. at 1681 
77 Id. 
78 /d . 
79 Immigration and Nationality Act , 8 U.S.CA. §1158 and 1229 (2013) . 
80 Moncrieffe at 1682. 
81 /d . 
82 Immigration and Nationality Act , 8 U.S.CA. §1101 (2013). 
83 Moncrieffe at 1682. 
84 Immigration and Nationality Act , 8 U.S.CA . §1227 (2013) . 
85 Moncrieffe at 1683 . 
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Lopez v. Gonzalez86 ; Johnson v . United States87 ; and Carachuri-Rosend~ v. Holder.88 
Pursuant to Lopez, the Court addressed specifically that a crime, regardless of what the 
law is titled, is only a crime under the CSA if the state crime statute specifically delineates 
actions, which are punishable as a felony under federallaw 89 • In Lopez, the court held that a 
state classification of a crime either as a misdemeanor or felony does not have an impact on 
whether or not a specific crime is categorized as an aggravated felony under the CSA.90 Rather, 
the Court held in Lopez, that there needs to be a categorical approach to approaching cases under 
the CSA .91 To meet the requirements of the categorical approach" .. . . a state drug offense 
must meet two conditions: It must "necessarily" proscribe conduct that is an offense under the 
CSA , and the CSA must "necessarily" prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.92" The 
significance of this is that the Georgia statute under which Moncrieffe was convicted does not 
explicitly describe the conduct that was described under the CSA felony provision. This 
difference demonstrates that because there is no quantity requirement delineated in the Georgia 
statute , it is not equivocal to the INA statute, which means that Moncrieffe could not be 
automatically deported under the INA. 
The Court cited to Carachuri-Rosendo, in which the Court held that when a person is 
convicted of an aggravated felony under the CSA, there is no possibility that the person will be 
granted a stay of removal by the Attorney General.93 The Court utilized this case to demonstrate 
standard rule applicable for people convicted of an aggravated felony under the CSA. However, 
86 Lopez v. Gonzalez , 549 U.S. 47 (2006) 
87 Johnson v. United States , 559 U.S. 133 (2010) 
88 Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010) 
89 Moncrieffe at 1686. 
90 /d. at 1685 
9 1 /d. 
92 /d . 
93 Carachuri-Rosendo , 560 U.S. 563 (2010) 
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pursuant to Johnson, when evaluating whether a person's crime constitutes a felony under the 
federal law, it is the definition that is annunciated that makes the determination regarding 
whether a case is to be prosecuted under federal law as a federal felony. When these two cases 
are put together, as was done in Moncrieffe, the Court highlighted that in the dicta between 
Carachuri-Rosendo and Johnson, the Court in those cases stated that even if someone is not 
convicted of an aggravated felony, they are still convicted of a felony and can be deported. The 
only difference is that a person not convicted of an aggravated felony is no longer deported 
automatically94 . This is the issue that was addressed in Moncrieffe, and it is because of the case 
law that Sotomayor held that the difference in the descriptions between the Georgia statute and 
the CSA created a situation in which Moncrieffe was not convicted of a crime which required 
automatic deportation. 
In deciding this case, Sotomayor's three-prong analysis was not completely used because 
there was no Constitutional issue dealt with in the case, but she fully employed two-thirds of the 
three-prong analysis. In this case, her usage of her three-prong analysis was clear in her 
comparison and evaluation of the statutes that were the central issue in the case, as well as 
relying on the case law of the Court to reach the decision in Moncrieffe. Sotomayor's three-
prong analysis is used throughout her opinions, but it is in her dissents and concurrences that it 
can be seen more clearly in her dissents and concurrences the theory that she supplements her 
three-prong analysis with personal knowledge and experience. 
B. Fidelity in the Law in Criminal Law Concurrences and Dissents 
In her time as a Justice, Sotomayor has authored twenty-two concurrences and twenty-
seven dissents. Four of them are highlighted below. Each of the cases highlighted is a criminal 
94 /d. at 1687. 
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law and procedure case, two of which are concurrences and two of which are dissents. While not 
writing the majority opinion in any of the cases, Sotomayor still employed her patented three-
prong judicial fidelity theory. Additionally, as was previously explained, it is my theory that she 
supplements her three-prong theory with her knowledge and experience regarding he criminal 
justice system. The four cases discussed which exemplify her three-prong approach combined 
with criminal justice experience are: Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, a concurrence on a 
Fourth Amendment search and seizure case involving a revolver; Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 
S. Ct. 716 (2012), a dissent on a case regarding an identification of a suspect through a show-up; 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, a concurrence in which the Court held the attachment of a 
Global Positioning System (GPS) device was illegal and therefore an illegal search and seizure 
against Jones pursuant to the Fourth Amendment; and Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044 
(2012), a dissent regarding a an implied acquittal in relation to the double jeopardy clause. 
1. Sotomayor Utilized her Fidelity in the Law Judicial Theory and Her History in 
Criminal Law and Procedure Through Her Concurrence in Davis v. United States 
In Davis, Sotomayor employed her three-prong system in her concurrence, in which she 
agreed with the holding of the Court, but not all of the dicta that forms the basis to the holding. 
In Davis, the defendant, a convicted felon, was arrested for giving a false name to officers during 
a routine traffic stop95 . When arrested, Davis and the vehicle were searched, during which the 
officers found a revolver that belonged to Davis96 . Davis moved to have the evidence of the gun 
suppressed, which was denied under the established Eleventh Circuit precedent stating the search 
was legal97 . Davis, reserving his Fourth Amendment challenge to the decision, brought it up on 
95 Davis at 2425. 
96/d. 
97 /d. 
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appeal98 • While the case was being appealed, the Supreme Court issued the decision of Arizona 
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), which held that to perform a warrantless search of a vehicle, the 
officers must demonstrate a continued belief that their safety was threatened. On appeal, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the vehicle search violated Davis's Fourth Amendment rights under 
Gant, but upheld the decision of the trial court to allow the evidence of the revolver in the case, 
stating the exclusionary rule did not bar evidence of the revolver to be presented99 • The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the circuits regarding vehicle searches 
incident to arrest.100 . 
In her concurrence, Sotomayor relied primarily on three cases, two of which were often 
used concurrently with one another. The three primary cases discussed were Herring v. United 
States101 , a case discussing the arresting of a defendant based on a warrant not properly being 
rescinded when it was supposed to have been; Illinois v. Krull102 , a case discussing a warranted 
search based on a warrant that should never had been issued because the legislative authorization 
behind the warrant was later found unconstitutional under the United States Constitution; and 
United States v. Johnson103 , a case in which the Court held that police cannot enter a suspects 
home without a warrant on a felony arrest. In these cases she primarily relied on the case law to 
support her findings, and it is because of this that it's the theory of this paper that she also used 
--...ft. ..,.""· ./ 
/ 
her personal knowledge and experience to supplement the case law to reach her conclusions. 
In citing to each of these cases in her concurrence, she noted the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule, and the purpose of established cases to be binding both in the future and 
98 /d. at 2424 
99 Davis at 2425. 
100 Davis at 2424. 
101 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
102 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
103 United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982). 
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retroactively 104. However, looking specifically to the exclusionary rule, Sotomayor concurs that 
it is not applicable in Davis, and it is because of that, that she concurred in the judgment that was 
authored by the Court105 . In her concurrence, her opinion differs from that of the Court in that 
she addresses an issue that the dissent brings up that the Court does not. This issue is the issue of 
an officers culpability when performing in a way that has not yet been settled by existing 
precedent.106 To this, Sotomayor agues that it is not the officer's culpability that is the root of 
the issue, but rather if their culpability has an effect on the deterrence effect of exclusion.107 It is 
this difference in the issue regarding the culpability of the officer that stems the theory that 
Justice Sotomayor utilizes her personal knowledge and experience to supplement the case law. 
The reason for this is that in her concurrence, she is getting to a separate more tangible issue of 
officer behavior and its effect on the deterrence aspect of the exclusionary rule. I theorize that 
her seeing this connection in a way that her colleagues did not is because she is utilizing her 
personal knowledge and experience rather than just sticking to the case law that is presented. 
2. Sotomayor Utilized Her Fidelity in the Law Judicial Theory and Her History in 
Criminal Law and Procedure Through Her Dissent in Perry v. New Hampshire 
In her dissent in Perry, Sotomayor demonstrated her usage of her three-prong system 
through citing most poignantly to five cases, in addition to the case that was decided by the 
majority. The five poignant cases that she cited to are: Manson v. Braithwaite108 ; Stovall v. 
D 1o9 u . d s u:' d 110 d .,..., .1 B. 111 enno ; nzte tates v. na e ; an lYeZ v. zggers . 
In Perry, the Court granted certiorari on a case that had been appealed from the trial court 
104 Davis at 2435 (20 13) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
105 /d. 
106 /d. at 2436 
107 /d. 
108 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 ( 1977) 
109 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 ( 1967) 
110 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) 
111 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) Holding that a reliable witness identification is not overturned simply 
because the officers could have used better tactics to achieve an identification from the witness 
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through the United States Supreme Court. In Perry, the defendant was convicted of theft by 
unauthorized taking based on the identification of Perry by a witness named Nubia Blandon, who 
identified him during an impromptu and accidental show up. The Court granted certiorari to 
resolve the difference of opinion regarding whether the Due Process Clause requires a trial judge 
to make an independent decision regarding the reliability of an eyewitness identification that was 
issued during an accidental suggestive circumstances-which in the present case, was an 
impromptu show up. In the decision, the Court held that accidental show ups, or broadly any 
type of accidental miscarriage of justice done by the officers does not create the same violation 
of a person's due process rights in regards to witness identification. Sotomayor, dissenting from 
the Court, utilized the case law and it appears that once again, used her previous personal 
knowledge regarding criminal law and procedure to support her conclusion. In her dissent, her 
conclusion was that regardless of how it happened, an impermissible witness identification due 
to accidental police corroboration has a direct negative correlation to the reliability of a 
witness.112 She argues that this correlation is then not able to be fully articulated or addressed in 
court based on the decision of the Court in Perry113 • 
In the Perry dissent, Sotomayor first cited to Brathwaite, a case in which the Court held 
that reliability is the cornerstone of witness testimony. Citing to this case, Sotomayor raised the 
issue regarding the testimony of witnesses that haven't first been assured of their reliability 
before they testify .114 Additionally, she discusses the fact that when a witnesses' reliability is 
hampered by a possible suggestion by the officers, there is a natural hint of impropriety .115 The 
issue was the impromptu show up which led to the witness identification of Perry as the man 
112 Perry at 731 (2013) (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) 
113 !d. at 730-40. 
114 !d. at 731. 
115 ld. 
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who she saw breaking into cars in the parking lot below her116• Additionally, still citing to 
Brathwaite, Sotomayor highlighted the fact that the Court has previously held that the reliability 
of a witness is the prerequisite to determine if the testimony being elicited by the witness is 
admissible. Also from Brathwaite, Sotomayor discusses the issue that officers, while 
unintentional, may send cues to witnesses when witnesses are providing information regarding 
the correct perpetrator of a crime117 . Applying that to the facts of Perry, Sotomayor was 
highlighting the fact that even if the officers did not intentionally create a situation where there 
would be improper police conduct creating a show-up during which the witness identified Perry 
as the perpetrator of breaking into cars, that it is very likely that there were cues given that 
impact the reliability of the witnesses identification118 . 
The second case Sotomayor cited to in the Perry dissent was Stovall, a case in which the 
Court held that an identification should be excluded if a pretrial identification by a witness was 
overly suggestive to the point that it violated due process. Citing to the dicta in Stovall, she 
highlighted the fact that an eyewitness' testimony at trial is artificially inflated, therefore limiting 
the jury's ability to properly assess the reliability of the information being conveyed119 • 
Furthermore, in her dissent, Sotomayor highlighted three factors from Wade that directly 
spoke to the administration of justice, in regards to the reliability of eyewitness testimony in 
court120• The Wade factors are: that a jury not be subjected to unreliable eyewitness testimony, 
but that the per se rule established in Wade suppresses too much reliable information; that the per 
se rule served as a deterrent to police misconduct in receiving witness identifications; and that 
the per se rule had numerous drawbacks regarding the administration of justice in witness 
116 /d. at 734. 
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identification cases. 
Once again, primarily relying on case law in regards to her position explained in her 
dissent, it is because of this that I theorize she utilized her personal knowledge and experience to 
supplement the case law. It is my theory that as a prosecutor, the chances are greater that she, at 
the very least, was witness to types of unfair lineups that weren't per se unconstitutional, but still 
resulted in an biased or police-influenced identification. It is because of this that it appears that 
she takes such a different stance from the rest of the court because in thinking of the facts of the 
case, she is able to apply her personal knowledge in a way that the other Justices are not. 
3. Sotomayor Utilized her Fidelity in the Law Judicial Theory and Her History in 
Criminal Law and Procedure Through Her Concurrence in United States v. Jones 
During the 2012 Session, Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurrence in which she citied to 
numerous cases which demonstrate her three prong judicial approach, in addition to her reliance 
on personal knowledge and history based on her experience working in criminal law and 
procedure. In Jones, the Court granted certiorari to resolve the split in opinion of the circuit 
courts regarding the attachment of a GPS monitoring device to a vehicle in a public parking lot, 
which was then used to monitor their locations so that the state could receive information 
regarding a possible connection to narcotics trafficking in the District of Columbia (D.C.) metro 
area.121 In Jones, the defendant was suspected of participating in narcotics trafficking in D.C., 
and to combat this trafficking, the FBI and Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) obtained a 
warrant that authorized them to attach a GPS system to Jones' wife's car, from which they would 
monitor the activity of the vehicle122 . When authorizing the warrant, the court gave the FBI and 
MPD ten days to attach the GPS system, within the boundaries of D .C. On the eleventh day after 
the warrant was issued, in a public parking lot in Maryland, the FBI attached the approved GPS 
12 1 Jones at 948 . 
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device on the bottom of the car123 . While the GPS device was attached to the car, there was 
evidence gathered that supported the charges addressing narcotics trafficking that were brought 
against Jones 124• After formal charges were brought against Jones, he was indicted by a grand 
jury, after which he was tried for conspiracy and convicted by a jury in the D.C. District 
Court125 . The case was appealed to the D.C. Federal District Court, which reversed the 
conviction stating that the evidence that was obtained was a result of a warrantless search 126 . 
The government then appealed that decision to the D.C. Circuit Court, which denied the petition 
issued by the Government to have a rehearing en banc .127 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to resolve the issue regarding the gathering of evidence based on a search that was the result of 
an expired warrant128 . In resolving the issue, the Court held that information gathered from the 
placement of a GPS device to the undercarriage of a car constitutes a search.129 While she did 
not agree thoroughly with the dicta of the opinion, Sotomayor agreed in the holding of the case, 
and issued one of her seven concurrences of the 2011 term. 
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor cited to the Court's opinion in which Justice Scalia 
enunciated that under the protection guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, there is a search 
when the government obtains information as a result of impeding on a protected area130• 
Additionally, Sotomayor cited to a dozen cases, two of which will be highlighted in addition to 
the aforementioned Constitutional interpretation regarding the protections guaranteed under the 
Fourth Amendment. The two primary cases that will be discussed are Smith v. Maryland131 , and 
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United States v. Knotts.132 
Citing to Smith, Sotomayor noted that a search under the Fourth Amendment is carried 
out illegally when the "government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society 
recognizes as reasonable."133 Additionally, while citing to Miller further in her concurrence, 
Sotomayor enunciated the fact that while it was once a standard holding, a person may have an 
expectation of privacy even for information that is voluntarily disclosed to third parties134 . In her 
concurrence, Sotomayor also cited to Knotts, which stated that when the government creates a 
physical intrusion into space that is protected by the constitution, there is a probability that there 
is a violation of protected Fourth Amendment rights.135 In addition to the aforementioned cases, 
Justice Sotomayor highlights in her concurrence that she agrees with Justice Alito regarding the 
fact that the attachment of the GPS device was an intrusion on a reasonable expectation of 
privacy .136 
In her concurrence, Sotomayor utilizes two-thirds of her three prong approach by first 
evaluating the meaning of a search under the Fourth Amendment, and then using caselaw to 
support her difference of opinion in dicta from the majority .137 It is in this concurrence that she 
is able to once again demonstrate her judicial theory of fidelity in the law through combining the 
text of the Constitution and the established case law of the Court. 
4. Sotomayor Utilized her Fidelity in the Law Judicial Theory and Her History in 
Criminal Law and Procedure Through Her Concurrence in Blueford v. Arkansas 
The last case to be discussed is Blueford, in which Sotomayor issued a dissent, balking at 
the Court's approach to the double jeopardy standard. In Blueford, the Court granted certiorari 
132 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
133 Jones at 955. (Sotomayor, J ., concurring) 
134 Jones at 958 . 
135 Jones at 955 . 
136 Id. 
137 ld. at 954 
32 
to resolve the issue regarding a non-specified acquittal being an acquittal that bars double 
jeopardy under the protection of the Fifth Amendment. In Blue ford, the defendant was charged 
with capital murder for causing the death of a one-year old infant. Charged in Arkansas, the 
statute under which he was charged, includes the highest charge of capital murder and all of the 
lesser-included charges of first-degree murder, manslaughter and negligent homicide138 . 
Through the jury instructions, the judge instructed the jury that before moving on to a 
lesser-included offense, the jury must first find the defendant guilty or not guilty on the greater 
offense139 . Additionally, the jurors were given a set of verdict forms which allowed for the jury 
to convict the defendant either of one, all or none of the crimes with which he was charged140• 
After the case was presented to the jury, the jury went back into their deliberation room. After 
deliberating for a few hours, the foreperson of the jury disclosed in open court that the jury was 
unanimous in its decision regarding finding Blueford not guilty on the two highest charges, but 
that they were deadlocked on manslaughter, and had not yet started a discussion regarding the 
negligent homicide charge141 • The trial judge instructed the jury to continue to deliberate, but 
even after a prolonged deliberation, the jury was not able to come to a unanimous decision on the 
lesser two charges with which Blueford was charged142 . When the jury returned to the 
courtroom after they failed to make a decision on the lesser two charges, the judge declared a 
mistrial. 
After the mistrial decision, Arkansas requested a retrial, Blueford argued to the court that 
he was already acquitted of the capital murder and first degree murder charges, and therefore 
retrying him on these charges went against the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth 
138 Blueford at 2049. 
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Amendment143 . The trial court denied Blueford' s motion, and that decision was upheld by the 
Arkansas Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether 
Blueford was acquitted of the first two charges, therefore barring a second trial on those charges 
under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment144 . The Court, in a 6-3 decision, held 
that because the jury was not permitted acquit on some charges but not others, and the fact that 
the jury did not renew their unanimous decision of not guilty on the higher two charges when 
they stated their continued state of deadlock, the double jeopardy clause did not bar a retrial. 
Justice Sotomayor, who was joined by Ginsberg and Kagan, authored a dissent outlining her 
reasoning, as explained through her three-prong system, that justice mandates that Blueford not 
be retried on the first two charges because that would violate the double jeopardy clause of the 
Fifth Amendment145 • 
In her dissent, Sotomayor cited to numerous cases, of which four are highlighted below. 
The four highlighted cases that are cited are: Arizona v. Washington146; United States v. Martin 
Linen Supply Co., a case in which the court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of the lower 
court which dismissed a case after the jury was unable to come to a decision after deliberating 
for seven days, under the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c); United States v. Jorn147 , a 
case regarding the double jeopardy clause and whether it is applicable after a judge has ordered 
that a trial be aborted after it had commenced; and Downum v. United State/48 , in which the 
Court granted certiorari in a case discussing double jeopardy protection after the second 
empaneling of a jury after a key prosecution witness was not available to testify before the first 
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jury empaneled. Additionally, she stated two main reasons why the majority was wrong when 
they wrote their opinion, which are the primary reasons to her authoring the dissent. 
Of the four cases highlighted, three of the cases are cited to in the first paragraph of her 
dissent149 . The first case cited to is Washington, in which the Court decided a case that 
specifically addresses the issue of double jeopardy in regards to a jury nullification issue. The 
second case cited to in her dissent is Martin Linen Supply Co., in which Sotomayor cited to the 
fact that an acquittal occurs when there is a resolution on some or all of the charges a defendant 
is charged with.150 The opening paragraph also cites to lorn in stating that it is improper for a 
trial judge to declare a mistrial before the jury has reached a decision on each of the charges with 
which the defendant is charged unless there is the consent of the defendant. This issue, 
Sotomayor argues was not present in Blueford, or a "manifest necessity." Citing to these three 
cases, Sotomayor enunciated that post acquittal , the double jeopardy clause directly prohibits a 
second trial/ 51 and that in this case, the first trial resulted in an acquittal because it was a 
unanimous decision against guilt in regards to the top two charges 152 . Utilizing the cases, 
Sotomayor stated her two reasons why she was dissenting from the majority opinion. 
The two primary reasons Sotomayor stated for dissenting from the majority opinion were 
that the examples the majority used to support their decision did not present the same facts as 
Blueford, specifically in regards to the open-court announcement by the foreperson that the jury 
had unanimously found the defendant not guilty of the greater two charges with which he was 
charged 153 . The second reason stated by Justice Sotomayor was that she disagrees with the 
factual basis that is employed by the majority that suggests the jury's deliberations could have 
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happened in the manner that is being attested to by the majority .154 
The last example of precedent that is cited to by Justice Sotomayor was when she cited to 
Downum, stating that when there is ambiguity in a decision rendered by a jury, that in adhering 
to the established precedent of the Court and the mandate of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the 
ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the defendant155 • 
Together, both through citing to case law directly speaking to the bounds and purview of 
the Fifth Amendment, Sotomayor demonstrated her continued adherence to fidelity in the law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Throughout her tenure on federal benches, Justice Sotomayor has upheld her three prong 
judicial theory. While every prong is not always utilized in every opinion, concurrence, or 
dissent, like her colleagues her fervor and resolve to maintain judicial neutrality demonstrated 
through her history on the bench. When deciding cases, when applicable she carefully examines 
the Constitution, applicable statutes and relevant case law. Additionally, as has been previously 
noted, it appears that at times she supplements her constitutional and case law analysis with her 
personal knowledge and experience in the criminal justice system. During her confirmation 
hearings, Justice Sotomayor described her judicial style, and while she sometimes adds to her 
style through utilizing her real world experience, her judicial style has not changed, making her 
one of the strongest voices on the Court. 
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